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Abstract
The existence of a thermodynamic arrow of time in the present universe implies
that the initial state of the observable portion of our universe at (or near) the “big
bang” must have been very “special”. We argue that it is not plausible that these
special initial conditions have a dynamical origin.
There is no question that our present universe displays a thermodynamic arrow of time:
We all have observed phenomena in our everyday lives where entropy is seen to increase
significantly, but no one has ever reliably reported an observation of entropy decrease in a
macroscopic system. This fact raises a number of obvious questions. Some of these questions
have straightforward answers—although they largely “beg the question”:
• Question: Why is there a thermodynamic arrow of time in the present universe?
• Answer: Because the present entropy of the universe is very low compared with how
high it could be. It is well understood that during the normal course of dynamical
evolution, an isolated system will spend the overwhelming majority of its time in a
state of (nearly) maximum entropy. Therefore, if we find a system to be in a state of
low entropy, it is overwhelmingly likely that we will observe it to evolve to a state of
higher entropy. The probability of observing it to evolve to a state of lower entropy is
vanishingly small.
• Question: Why is the entropy of the present universe low?
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• Answer: Because in the past, the entropy was even lower than it is now. Although
the entropy has been increasing with time, it has not had time to reach (or even come
very close to) a state of maximum entropy. This explains why it is still low today. In
other words, the entropy of the present universe is low because it was much lower a
billion years ago; it was very low a billion years ago because it was even lower than
that two billion years ago, etc. Clearly, this line of reasoning leads us back to (or, at
least, very near to) the “big bang”: The reason why the entropy of the present universe
is low is that the entropy of the universe at or near the “big bang” was extremely low
[1].
The above claim that the entropy of the very early universe must have been extremely
low might appear to blatantly contradict the “standard model” of cosmology: There is over-
whelmingly strong reason to believe that in the early universe, matter was (very nearly) uni-
formly distributed and (very nearly) in thermal equilibrium at uniform temperature. Doesn’t
this correspond to a state of (very nearly) maximum entropy, not a state of low entropy?
In fact, for a system subject only to short-range forces as usually considered in textbooks,
in a state of maximum entropy, matter would be homogeneously distributed and at uniform
temperature. But, the situation changes dramatically when an unscreened, long-range force
such as gravity is present. Even in Newtonian gravity, for a sufficiently large system, the
entropy can always be increased by clumping the system and using the binding energy that
is thereby released to heat up the system. In Newtonian gravity, this phenomenon is usu-
ally referred to as “Jeans’ instability” or “gravithermal instability”. For point particles in
Newtonian gravity, there is no bound to the binding energy, and an isolated, self-gravitating
system will simply become more and more clumpy with time. General relativity effectively
provides a cutoff to this process via the formation of black holes. Nevertheless, in general
relativity, for a sufficiently large system, the state of maximum entropy will not correspond
to a homogeneous distribution of matter but rather will contain a large black hole. The
entropy of this black hole (as given by the Bekenstein-Hawking formula) will be enormously
greater than a state at the same energy and volume where matter is distributed homoge-
neously. In this way, it can be understood that the early universe was in a state of extremely
low entropy compared with how high it’s entropy could have been [1].
Before proceeding further, I should add some caveats to the above discussion. The
arguments that underlie our understanding of statistical physics and thermodynamics are
based upon having a time translationally invariant system whose dynamics are “ergodic”
to a suitable degree. Such arguments certainly do not apply straightforwardly to general
relativistic systems. In particular, although general relativistic systems are diffeomorphism
covariant, they are not “time translation invariant” in the sense required to apply the usual
arguments of statistical physics. Furthermore, in a cosmological setting it seems clear that
dynamics cannot, in any sense, be “ergodic”: In what sense could an open universe that
expands forever (or a closed universe that recollapses within finite time) be said to “sample” a
suitably large portion of its allowed phase space? Finally, general relativity is a classical field
theory and, as such, would not be expected to have a sensible thermodynamics in any case
(for the same reason as classical electromagnetism suffers from the “ultraviolet catastrophe”);
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we should need to have a quantum theory of gravity and a complete understanding of all of
its fundamental degrees of freedom before one could hope to obtain a full understanding of
the thermodynamic behavior of gravity. For all of the above reasons, there does not presently
exist a general notion of “gravitational entropy”, and one should exercise considerable caution
when applying thermodynamic arguments to general relativistic systems, such as the entire
universe. In particular, recalling that for a closed universe in general relativity there is
no meaningful notion of the “total energy of the universe”, I see no reason to expect that
there will be a meaningful notion of the “total entropy of the universe”. Nevertheless,
there is very strong encouragement from all of the remarkable results obtained in black hole
thermodynamics (see, e.g., [2]) that in (quantum) general relativity, some notion of entropy
will exist and the basic form of the laws of thermodynamics will survive. On account of this,
I am reasonably confident that the essential content of the assertions and arguments of the
preceding paragraphs will also survive in some form.
The answers to the first two questions above lead us to the following question:
• Question: What caused the very early universe to be in a very low entropy state?
Here I do not have a simple answer to propose. But it would seem that, logically, there
are two basic ways to try to account for why the initial state of the very early universe was so
“special”: (i) The initial state of the universe was, in fact, “completely random”. However,
dynamical evolutionary behavior was then responsible for making (at least our portion of)
the universe be “very special”. (ii) The universe simply came into existence in a very special
state.
Viewpoint (i) appears to be presently favored by the overwhelming majority of cosmol-
ogists. It is usually taken for granted that the universe must have come into existence in
a “random state”, as though there were a “dartboard of initial conditions”, and the actual
initial conditions of our universe were selected by the throw of an unskilled and blindfolded
creator. Perhaps the best developed and most popular of the ideas for producing a universe
like the one that we see from random initial conditions is chaotic inflation. Here, one postu-
lates the existence of a scalar field (the “inflaton”) with suitable properties. With random
initial conditions for the metric and scalar field, most portions of the universe should recol-
lapse or expand to emptyness on a timescale of the order of the Planck time. However, there
also should, by chance, exist regions of sufficiently large size in which conditions are right
for the onset of inflation. These regions would then expand exponentially for many e-folding
times, so that they would dominate the volume of the universe. Within each inflated region,
the universe would be extremely homogeneous and isotropic (and extremely spatially flat),
with the only significant deviations from homogeneity and isotropy being those produced by
quantum fluctuations. These quantum fluctuations would then result in observable devia-
tions from isotropy in the microwave background and provide the seeds for the formation of
the structure observed in the present universe.
Inflationary models are extremely successful in predicting the kind of deviations from
homogeneity and anisotropy that we observe in our universe. Indeed, it is quite difficult
to come up with alternative models that so naturally produce Gaussian fluctuations of the
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correct amplitude and “scale-free” spectrum [3]. However, I do not believe that inflationary
models—or, for that matter, any other dynamical mechanism—can provide a satisfactory
answer to the above question as to why (a suitably large portion of) the very early universe
was in such a “special” state, and I therefore also do not believe that inflation can provide a
satisfactory explanation for the origin of the thermodynamic arrow of time1. My unhappiness
with attempts to use inflation or any other dynamical mechanism to try to account for our
observable universe being in very special state despite it’s having started in a random/generic
state can be seen as follows. In essence, in order to dynamically evolve from an assumed
“random” initial state to the kind of very “special” state we observe, it is necessary to
invoke rare and/or highly unlikely events. For example, in chaotic inflation, the initial
conditions needed to produce an inflating patch in the early universe are very “special”;
most regions would not inflate and would not evolve to a universe that looks anything like
ours. Of course, it is true that, nevertheless, some regions are bound to inflate. Indeed, if the
universe is infinite, the probability of having an inflating patch (and, indeed, infinitely many
such patches) is 1. Thus, there is no difficulty in arguing that it is possible that the portion
of the universe that we observe arose from an inflating patch as described in the chaotic
inflation scenario. But in an infinite universe starting with “random” initial conditions,
the probability of having a hugh patch that directly evolves—without inflation—to a region
indistinguishable from the observed universe also is 1 (as is the probability of producing a
universe indistinguishable from ours except that all elephants wear pink dresses), so it also
is possible that the portion of the universe that we observe arose in this manner. In order for
the chaotic inflationary scenario or other dynamical mechanisms to do better than this, it is
necessary to argue that, within the context of the model, observers in the universe are likely
to see a universe like the one we see; the presently observed universe should not merely be
a (highly unlikely) possibility that is allowed in the model but rather should be a prediction
of the model.
Unfortunately, as I now shall argue, it appears inevitable that the attempt to make pre-
dictions within the context of models of this sort leads one down an essentially circular path,
with little, if any, possibility of attaining any explanatory power. In order to predict what an
observer should see, one must modulate the probabilities of the various possible cosmological
occurrences by the “selection effect” that any observed portion of the universe must contain
conscious life in order to be observed. This modulation of probabilities is usually referred to
as the “anthropic principle”. Now, the probabilities of various cosmological occurences—such
1Recently, Carroll and Chen [4] have proposed that “spontaneous inflation” can account for a locally
observed arrow of time in a universe that is time symmetric on ultra-large scales. In their model, the universe
has entropy growing unboundedly in both the past and future. The universe is “normally” (i.e., in most of
the spacetime) a nearly empty deSitter spacetime, but, occassionally, thermal fluctuations produce regions of
inflation that result in a large increase of entropy in that region, and a corresponding locally observed arrow
of time. In their model, episodes of inflation would not be favored over episodes of “deflation” (i.e., eras
of exponential contraction, in which the entropy decreases); indeed, episodes of inflation would dominate
in the distant future, whereas episodes of deflation would dominate in the distant past. I do not find their
proposal to be plausible, but, in essentially all other respects, the discussion of the issue of the origin of the
thermodynamic arrow of time given in [4] is compatible with the viewpoints taken here.
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as the probability that a given patch will inflate—are already extremely difficult to estimate:
We have, at best, only a vague notion of what we mean by “random” or “generic” initial
conditions; we know very little about the true physical processes that may have occurred in
the very early universe; and, in any case, the probabilities of rare occurrences are notoriously
difficult to estimate (since rare occurrences often do not arise in “expected” ways). However,
our ignorance of the probabilities of various cosmological occurrences is truly dwarfed by our
(nearly) total ignorance of the probability of the existence of observers, since we know vir-
tually nothing about what is really required to produce conscious life. Therefore, it is usual
practice in such arguments to substitute the requirement that the observed portion of the
universe contain observers with the requirement that the observed portion of the universe
have some key features like ours, such as the presence of stars and galaxies. (Obviously,
in making such a substitution, one is effectively assuming that the only way—or, at least,
the most probable way—of producing conscious life is by following a route very similar to
ours; I, personally, do not find this assumption to be plausible.) But then, logically, the only
“prediction” being made is the determination of the probability of having a region of the
universe that is similar to the observed universe subject to the constraint that this region
possess certain key features that are known to be present in the observed universe. Even if
the calculation of this probability could be reliably done, I fail to see what one would learn
from it. In particular, I fail to see in what sense it would provide an “explanation” of why
the observable universe is in the state we find it to be in.
It seems to me to be far more plausible that the answer to the above question as to why
the very early universe was in a very low entropy state is that it came into existence in a
very special state. Of course, this answer begs the question, since one would then want to
know why it came into existence in a very special state, i.e., what principle or law governed
its creation. I definitely do not have an answer to this question. But I believe that it will
be more fruitful to seek an answer to this question than to attempt to pursue dynamical
explanations.
This research was supported in part by NSF grant PHY00-90138 to the University of
Chicago.
References
[1] R. Penrose, “Singularities and Time-Asymmetry”, in General Relativity, an Einstein
Centennary Survey, ed. by S.W. Hawking and W. Israel, Cambridge University Press
(Cambridge, 1979).
[2] R.M. Wald, Living Rev.Rel. 4, 6 (2001); gr-qc/9912119.
[3] S. Hollands and R.M. Wald, Gen. Rel. and Grav. 34, 2043 (2002); gr-qc/0205058.
[4] S.M. Carroll and J. Chen, hep-th/0410270 and gr-qc/0505037.
5
